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I Preamble
This paper will analyze the role of three1 non-African states in the Rwandan
genocide – Belgium, France and the United States. The three will be discussed in
alphabetic order, and the discussion will focus on the controversies surrounding each.
Belgium is included because it was the colonial power that administered the Trusteeship
for Rwanda from World War I to independence and remained intimately involved with
Rwanda since then. France and the United States were the two permanent members of the
Security Council most involved with Rwanda. In any case, the United States could not be
excluded, if only because it is the great power in the world since the demise of the Soviet
Union and the end of the Cold War. The unipolar world commenced at the same time as
the RPF invaded Rwanda at the beginning of this decade.
However, the United States has to be considered as well because of its major role
in preventing the use of the UN peacekeepers intervening in the genocide. That role is
judged by many to be so destructive that Gourevitch (1998) wrote: "The desertion of
Rwanda by the UN force was Hutu Power's greatest diplomatic victory to date, and it can
be credited almost single handedly to the United States." (p. 150) Alan J. Kuperman
(currently a PhD student at MIT researching the US role in Rwanda) repeated
Gourevitch's accusation. In an op-ed piece in the 24 December Washington Post,
however, he restricted the American failure to the period prior to 6 April, but broadened
the accusation to cover the entire realm of prevention rather than just the withdrawal of
UNAMIR. "(T)he United States almost single-handedly blocked international action in
Rwanda six weeks prior to the genocide, which might have prevented the bloodbath
altogether."
As discussed in the paper on the Arusha peace process, this is a great
exaggeration. The information provided in that other paper explains why accusing the
United States of playing a significant role in preventing action from being taken to stop
or to mitigate the genocide is correct. However, charging the United States with "almost
single-handedly" blocking international action to prevent the genocide or to force the
withdrawal of UNAMIR is sheer journalistic hyperbole. The role the United States
played is bad enough without, ironically, lightening its load of guilt by exaggeration.
Analyzing the roles of the three countries side-by-side will also permit
comparisons to be made in their respective roles in the genocide.
2II BELGIUM
The reconsideration of Belgian's role in Rwanda has polarized Belgian society.
The genocide instigated a period of introspection that only two events in recent history
have done – the Nazi occupation of Belgium and the recent scandal connected with serial
Dutroux’, after the bodies of young girls were found in his house
on 26 August 1996. The arrival in Belgian of both Tutsi and Hutu "refugees" has
exacerbated that polarization. 2 Belgium has been the only country beside France to hold
an official inquiry into its role in the genocide.
On 24 July 1996, an ad hoc group in the Commission of Foreign Affairs of the
Belgian Senate initiated an investigation of Belgian's role in Rwanda in the 1993-94
period. Its report summarized the available documentation. The contents revealed that the
Belgium government knew a great deal more about the impending genocide before it
burst into full blossom on 6 April 1994 than had theretofore been believed.3 The
government was also aware in advance of the risk to the Belgian peacekeepers before ten
of them were murdered by the armed forces of the instigators of the coup in Rwanda that
set off the genocide firestorm. As a result of those findings, the Senate instigated a
Commission of Enquiry4, which, on 30 April 1997, became a full-fledged judicial
commission with power to subpoena witnesses. It produced a very informative, even if
somewhat incomplete report5 (because the Belgian role and the role of others is not
contextualized) on the Belgian role in Rwanda 1993-1994.6
This section will take up Belgian's role under the following headings:
1.   Belgium's Provision of Economic Assistance to Rwanda;7
2. Belgium's Diplomatic Efforts in Rwanda Prior to the Genocide;
3. Belgium's Military Role in Rwanda.
I will not consider Belgium's colonial role; it has been extensively covered in
many publications.8 In fact, I will concentrate on the period beginning with the year
1990.
1. The Role of Belgium as a Provider of Economic Assistance to Rwanda 9
Following a new general policy of transferring the ownership and control over aid
programs to the recipient with the goal of enhancing local government structures and
enabling the government to plan its human resource requirements, the Belgian bilateral
agency adopted a new partnership program for the nineties. To enhance recipient
involvement in the development projects, control over aid negotiations and management
was transferred from Brussels to Kigali.
Secondly, at the beginning of the nineties, when Rwanda was faced with handling
its war with the RPF as well as dealing with the continuing crisis of the crash of the
coffee market,10 Belgium increased its aid to Rwanda. In the first full year after the RPF
invaded Rwanda, Belgium provided 200 million in Belgian francs (BF) as aid and also
financed a BF 400 million World Bank financial package to assist Rwanda with its
3structural adjustment program when Rwanda signed its Structural Adjustment Loan
(SAL) with the bank. The 1991 aid package translated into US$56. In 1990, development
aid had only totaled US$43 million and in the latter part of the eighties had only averaged
US$30 million. Project feasibility11 helped to account for continued and even increased
inflow.12 In 1992, the aid package was increased again and totaled BF720 million.
In addition to the development aid changes and increases, Belgium was the fourth
largest donor of emergency aid (after the World Food Program, the US and France). That
aid began in earnest when the RPF launched a new offensive in March of 1992,
ostensibly in response to the increased attacks against Tutsi within Rwanda. The previous
total of 100,000 displaced as a result of the RPF invasion quickly almost doubled. In
response to these massacres, a coalition of Belgian NGOs proposed sanctions against the
Habyarimana regime. (Reyntjens 1995, 269) The high numbers and demands for aid led
donors to create a Crisis Committee for Emergency Aid composed of donors, Government
representatives, NGOs and representatives of UN agencies to provide local coordination and
to monitor the delivery of aid. Their needs assessment estimate was $19 million and it very
soon proved to be far too little.
In each successive advance of the RPF, including the dramatic one in the spring
of 1993 which gave such an important thrust to the conclusion of the Arusha talks, the
numbers of displaced eventually grew to almost one million people, 15% of Rwanda's
population. In 1993, total aid to Rwanda from Belgium began to drop. More significantly,
whereas in 1990, the total aid package in 1990 had been development assistance and in
1991 emergency aid only represented 10% of the budget, by 1993 the bulk of the new
monies from Belgium was going towards emergency aid. However, after the Arusha
Accords had been signed, four new aid agreements in the health sector were committed
worth BF81 million. (Cf. Africa Research Bulletin, November/December 1993)
On 11 February 1993, before the RPF March offensive when the displaced
population was still at 500,000, a meeting of donors took place. Representatives from
USAID, Germany, France, Switzerland, Belgium, the EU, UNICEF, UNDP, FAO,
CARITAS,  and ICRC attended. Food stocks in Rwanda had been reduced to a 2-3 week
supply. Famine was predicted. Opening a new direct supply route through territory occupied
by the RPF was urged. On the next day, an interagency meeting was convened by DHA in
response to Habiyarimana's letters to the Secretary General of 1 January and 1 February.
The key issue was the distribution of food to the displaced. At that meeting the donors
proposed to have a follow-up meeting which would discuss diverting the country program
development funds to supply the emergency assistance program. Events would accelerate
these plans. At the beginning of March, the number of displaced was 600,000. By the end of
the month the numbers had risen to 950,000. Despite Rwandese government objections,
henceforth, emergency aid displaced the development program, and Habyariamana's regime
headed towards bankruptcy in 1993.
By mid-1993, the same consortium of NGOs published a detailed report on
human rights violations in Rwanda, partly based on the report of the International Inquiry
into Human Rights Violations that had been published in March. (Reyntjens 1995, 269)
4The Belgium government recalled its ambassador and threatened to cut aid unless the
human rights situation improved. (Reyntjens 1994, 194)
There was a third program of aid as well as the development and emergency aid.
Belgium had been Rwanda's traditional provider of military aid. However, in 1991
Belgium stopped providing Rwanda with lethal weapons. (Braeckman 1994, 152) France
had taken over as Rwanda's main military supplier.
In sum, Belgium was not a supplier of military aid in the build up to the genocide.
Belgium followed the pattern of virtually all the western donors except for its larger per
capita contribution. Belgium remained economically supportive of the Habyarimana
regime well into 1992. When the numbers affected by the conflict grew too large,
emergency aid replaced development aid, though some development aid was restored as a
carrot after the Arusha Accords were signed. As well, some degree of concern with the
Habyarimana regime's human rights record may also have had some impact on Belgian
economic assistance policy.
2. Belgium's Diplomatic Efforts in Rwanda Prior to the Genocide
Belgium was a major initiator of the diplomatic effort to end the war when the
RPF invaded on 1 October 1990. By 15 October, the Belgian Prime Minister himself,
Wilfried Martens, along with the Foreign Minister, travelled to Nairobi to meet
Habyarimana in Nairobi to discuss the conflict and to urge a peaceful resolution of the war.
Martens also agreed to raise the issue of the invasion at the next EU meeting. Two days
later, Martens was in Mwanza, Tanzania, with Habyarimana in toe, where together they met
the President of Tanzania, Ali Hassan Mwinyi. Martens and Mwinyi together persuaded
Habyarimana to agree to the withdrawal of foreign troops and the repatriation of the
refugees as conditions for a cease-fire. In the next two days, the very high level Belgian
diplomatic mission travelled to Burundi to put in motion plans for a regional conference.
Three days later, Martens' shuttle diplomacy took him to Kampala, Uganda, where he met
with Museveni , both to brief the President of Uganda on the peacemaking efforts and to
bring him on board.
Upon Martens return to Europe, he tried to persuade the EU to become involved
as peacekeepers by providing an interpositional force. He was unsuccessful. Instead,
Europe offered an expression of concern, particularly with the human rights record of the
Habyarimana regime. The EU did support the regional initiative under the auspices of the
OAU to mediate that the Belgians and Tanzanians had agreed upon.
After this initial flurry of activity and leadership, the Belgians moved into a
supportive and relatively minor role. However, as mentioned above, in response to the
publication of the revelations in the International Human Rights Report in March of
1993, Belgium briefly recalled its ambassador as an expression of disapproval of
Habyarimana's human rights record. Belgium would not become an important player
again until it provided peacekeepers for UNAMIR and then decided to withdraw them.
5Prior to the death of 10 Belgian peacekeepers on 7 April, 1994, and the
subsequent Belgian decision to withdraw its peacekeepers, Belgium had engaged in a
flurry of activities in an effort to warn the international community about the possibility
of the resumption of the conflict as well as the prospect of a massacre of a large number
of civilians. Belgium had also tried to get the Security Council to strengthen the
peacekeeping force. Belgian's warnings and the proposal for an enhanced peacekeeping
force largely fell on deaf ears,
3. Belgian's Military Role in Rwanda
Belgium began its military involvement in Rwanda shortly after the invasion by
the RPF on 1 October 1990. On 4 October, 500 Belgian paratroopers landed in Kigali. In
good part, because the Belgian government consisted of a coalition of Christian
Democrats and Socialists who were at odds over Rwandan policy, the military forces,
ostensibly there to protect Belgian nationals, played no other role.13 On 27 October,
following the Belgian diplomatic mission to Africa, the 500 paratroopers were
withdrawn. Belgium did not become militarily involved again until the Arusha Accords
were signed and Belgium agreed to provide an experienced and well equipped full
battalion for UNAMIR.
The murder of 10 Belgian members of UNAMIR prompted a public outcry in
Belgium by a public poorly informed about the situation in Rwanda. A strong push
quickly grew for Belgian withdrawal. In the interim, Belgium, along with France and
Italy, quickly mounted Nationals Evacuation Operations (NEOs) on 9-11 April with
virtually no advance warning or coordination with the UN. In fact, they made the
situation more difficult for UNAMIR: first they had to negotiate a weapons tight
guarantee from the factions to allow safe use of Kigali airport. Second, the presence of
French and Belgian aircraft created mayhem in the streets around Kigali as people tried to
flee the fighting.  “There was panic. Everyone wanted to leave Kigali while the French
and Belgian troops were at the airport. It was common knowledge that once the foreign
troops left, the warring factions were going to fight for capture and control of the airport”
(Anyidoho 34). As it turned out, this common knowledge proved to be erroneous and the
reduced UNAMIR mission retained control of the airport throughout the war.
However, given these beliefs and the public outcry over the murder of the 10
Belgian peacekeepers, Willy Claes, the Defence Minister, panicked. On 12 April in
Bonn, he personally informed the UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros Ghali, of
Belgian's intention to withdraw forthwith and unilaterally.14 The withdrawal, however,
was not just based on emotional factors. Belgium had been dissatisfied that Belgium had
been the only country to provide troops with a significant enforcement capacity. Belgium
was also disappointed that UNAMIR had not been equipped with the promised armoured
personnel carriers and helicopters.15
Even more significantly, just as Belgium had once lobbied strenuously for an
enhanced UNAMIR presence, it now advocated that the entire UNAMIR force be
withdrawn and lobbied strenuously to that end. Further, contrary to the promise the
6Belgian senior officer, Machal, made to General Dallaire, Belgium also ordered its troops
to bring all their equipment and weapons with them upon withdrawal.
The Belgian soldiers were extremely unhappy about abandoning their mission,
and especially about abandoning the 2000 Rwandan civilians that they had been
protecting and that they knew would meet certain death upon their withdrawal. They had
already been very discontented with the very restrictive interpretation of the rules of
engagement set forth by the DPKO. Their restriction to such a passive role had, in the
eyes of the Belgian soldiers, meant that they had lost loss of military credibility in the
eyes of the Rwandan army. The withdrawal now meant that they were viewed as cowards
as well, and morally irresponsible ones as well. It is not surprising that many of them
threw down their blue berets in disgust upon their return to Belgium.The Belgiums did
not leave Rwanda on a high note.
III THE ROLE OF FRANCE IN THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE
A. Preamble
Traditionally, French policy in Africa was driven by two dominant goals - the
preservation and enhancement of France's historical position in Africa largely through the
promotion of francophonie, and, secondly, the promotion of French economic supremacy
in francophone Africa. (Schraeder 1997, 206)16 French defence policy was intended to
supplement these goals through defence accords that made provision for supplying arms
and military advisers, and even military intervention to ensure stability. 17
Just a few weeks prior to this writing at the very end of 1998, France, the second
country after Belgium to conduct an official parliamentary inquiry into the 1994 genocide
in Rwanda18, issued its report.19 The Rwanda government described the report as a
"whitewash". 20 According to Rwandese radio, citing a statement from the president's
office, the parliamentary commission was set up to "absolve France of any role in the
genocide". According to the current Rwandan government, France played a "key role" in
the genocide. How? First, France participated in the "disinformation campaign" which
misled the international community. Secondly, France set up "Zone Turquoise" in
southwest Rwanda with the aim of reorganising the ex-FAR and Interahamwe militia.
Third, France had "systematically undermined efforts to address the course and the
aftermath of the genocide in Rwanda." The IRIN report said nothing about Rwanda's
older charges that France had been the major military supplier of Rwanda.
Did France play a key role in facilitating the genocide? Did France engage in a
disinformation campaign to deliberately mislead the international community? Was
Opération Turquoise launched to allow the ex-FAR and interahamwe to escape and
reorganize? Has France engaged in an effort to undermine any enquiry into the path of
the genocide?
Rwanda has not been the only party to level such charges. In his best selling book,
Gourevitch (1998) claims that, "the signal achievement of Opération Turquoise was to
7permit the slaughter of Tutsis to continue for an extra month, and to secure safe passage
for the genocidal command to cross, with a lot of its weaponry, into Zaire." (pp. 160-1)21
Gourevitch even quotes French ex-President, Valéry d'Estaing as accusing the French
command of "protecting some of those who had carried out the massacres." (p. 157) Peter
Uvin (1998) states baldly that France engaged in"blatant actions to shelter the genocidal
regime." (p. 99) Did Opération Turquoise, whatever its intentions, lengthen the period of
the genocide, protect the genocidists and then allow them to escape intact with all their
arms?
I have no reason to defend France. With the exception of some individual French
officials, France was the least cooperative state in supplying information to the
researchers who had worked on the report Astri Suhrke and I wrote for the international
community. (Adelman and Suhrke 1996) After they had received the draft and before we
had had an opportunity to respond to any criticisms, France sent a formal demarche (a
strong form of diplomatic protest) to Norway, Denmark and Sweden denouncing the
report and cancelled a head of state visit from Sweden. Further, at our presentation of the
draft report in Copenhagen at the end of 1995, the French denounced our report as full of
lies and distortions. They were particularly incensed at the charge that we had made that
France had continued to supply arms even after the genocide had started.22 The French
announced that they were withdrawing their financial support for the whole inquiry. And
when, after our presentation and before we wrote the final version, Astri Surke traveled to
Paris to try to explore the evidential basis of their concerns, the French officials were not
very forthcoming.
Yet when I read Kagame's or Gourevitch's criticisms of the role of France, I find
that they exaggerate to such an extent that they reduce rather than add to the level of
understanding.23 I will try to explain why by discussing the French role under the
following headings: 1) France's military support for the Habyarimana regime; 2) France's
diplomatic efforts to bring about a peaceful resolution of the conflict; and 3) Opération
Turquoise.
1. France's Military Support for the Habyarimana Regime:
On 4 October 1990, in response to a personal phone call from Habyarimana to Jean-
Christophe Mitterand, France sent a a small contingent of paratroopers (150 men) drawn
from the French force stationed in the Central African Republic in Operation Noroît. The
official instructions were to protect French expatriates in Rwanda.24  The troop strength
was increased to 350 in November when the Belgians left the country. To quote the report
I co-authored withAstri Suhrke (1998), ) "In keeping with military cooperation agreements,
Zaire and France sent troops to Rwanda at the time of the invasion. During the invasion and
during its aftermath, French policy was decided at the highest level (President Mitterand).
The immediate response was to send 'a few boys /_to help_/, old man Habyarimana', as the
head of Africa Unit in the Presidential Palace said at the time (Prunier 1995). France had
previously done the same for other allies in Francophone Africa, and had paratroopers
stationed in the region for that purpose. In this case, the determination to assist was
sharpened by the fact that the rebels had come from and, in some respects were part of,
8Anglophone Africa. The social origins and platform of the RPF also made them anathema
in some French conservative and army circles and earned them the pejorative label "Khmer
Noir", conveying the horrors of Cambodia's Khmer Rouge with the undemocratic practices
of a once aristocratic caste. The initial decision not to make a major power demonstration
reflected a belief that the RPF would easily be repulsed. Jean-Christophe Mitterand told
Prunier (1995) that he thought it would be all over in 2-3 months...The French backstopped
the Rwandan army in Kigali and "advised" Rwandans handling heavy artillery, but did not
consider the operation a major one."
Gourevitch (1998) argued incorrectly that this intervention by France was in violation
of the terms of its own military assistance agreement with Rwanda. (see endnote 2) His
explanation for France undermining its own agreements was that, "President Mitterand
liked Habyarimana, and Mitterand's son Jean-Christophe, an arms dealer and sometimes
commissar of African affairs in the French Foreign Ministry, liked him, too. (As military
expenditures drained Rwanda's treasury and the war dragged on, an illegal drug trade
developed in Rwanda; army officers set up marijuana plantations, and Jean-Christophe
Mitterand is widely rumoured to have profited from the traffic.) France funneled huge
shipments of armaments to Rwanda - right through the killings in 1994 - and throughout
the early 1990s, French officers and troops served as Rwandan auxilliaries, directing
everything from air traffic control and interrogation of RPF prisoners to frontline
combat." (p. 89)
Instead of explaining the intervention in terms of personal affections and corruption,
Clapham (1998) viewed the intervention as one based on francophonie. "In the eyes of
the Mitterand regime, this Ugandan support assumed the dimensions of an anglophone
conspiracy to take over part of francophone Africa, and the defence of Habyarimana
(and, hence, in turn, of the Hutu suprememicist ideology with which important elements
of his regime were already closely associated) became part of the more general defence
of francophonie and the French role in Africa, to the extent that to an anglophone
observer seems quite bizarre." (p. 199; cf. Prunier 1995, 102-107) I support this
explanation as the primary motive, provided that francophonie is understood in economic
and political terms as well as cultural ones. (Cf. Schraeder above)
Whatever the motivation, French support to the Habyarimana regime was critical.
"From the FPR invasion onward, France greatly stepped up its military support to the
Habyarimana regime. Active involvement of its troops is generally credited with helping
to halt both the October 1990 invasion and the March 1992 FPR offensive. However,
French military advisers were involved in many more ways in the operation of the army;
the French military's involvement in advising the president, training new recruits,
defending important installations, manning raodblocks, and interrogating prisoners has
been widely documented (Adelman and Suhrke 1996, 14-15; Braeckman 1994, 159;
Reyntjens 1994, 175; Rwanda Third Degree 1991; Rwanda: French Agenda 1992;
Verschave 1995). At the same time, the Habyarimana regime embarked on a campaign of
rearmament, again with prime support from France. Arms were imported from Egypt and
France with credits from French nationalized banks, and other arms were bought from
South Africa (Braeckman 1994, 149). As mentioned earlier, these arms were used to
9equip the army and the militia and were evenly widely distributed to ordinary citizens
throughout the country. Human Rights Watch documented that during the genocide, arms
were shipped from France to Rwanda, in contravention of a UN arms embargo." (Uvin, p.
97; we will return to the claims repeatedly made, including by myself, that France
continued to ship arms after the genocide commenced.)
In the beginning of the campaign, the French were confident that the Rwandan
government could defeat the RPF, perhaps by also complementing the military
superiority with some degree of political compromise. As Clapham (1998) put it, In June
of 1991, "neither side at this stage had any interest in reaching a settlement: the
government, secure in its military backing from France, was confident of victory, while
the RPF had no interest in admitting defeat. As the conflict ground on, despite various
disregarded ceasefires, the RPF became increasingly confident of its ability to maintain
the insurgency. By 1992, despite French support for the government forces that included
not only credits for weapons purchases but effective French operational control of the
counter-insurgency campaign (Prunier 1995, 100; JEEAR, 1996, 22), 25 the military
initiative had passed to the RPF." (p. 201) Finally, as Jones (1995, 242) claimed, French
military intelligence after the 1993 RPF offensive concluded that the RPF could defeat
the government forces.
This intelligence analysis proved to be deadly accurate as could be seen when the
RPF launched its military offensive on 8 February 1993. The impact on the balance of
strength was so significant that Rwanda had to ask France to send reinforcements to
bolster the army, which France did in two waves, on 9 February (150 troops) and 20
February (250 troops). The latter deployment was justified by France as being necessary
since the RPF advance threatened Kigali. Tanzanian and French intelligence sources
concluded at the time that the RPF could overrun the FAR were it not for the presence of
the French troops in Kigali. This conclusion would form the backdrop to the subsequent
round of negotiations. This perception evidently was shared by Habyarimana, for he
personally called for a return to the Arusha process on 23 February and truly serious
negotiations intent on concluding a full peace agreement began for the first time.
On 21 March, France began to withdraw its forces. The withdrawal was
completed on 11 December after the first units of UNAMIR had taken up positions in
Rwanda. However, France's withdrawal would prove to be short lived. For the Arusha
Accords broke down with the murder of Habyarimana on 6 April 1994 and the extermist
coup. This time the French troops returned but truly only to rescue European nationals.
"On 9 April, unannounced to Dallaire, the French advanced parties of Operation
Amaryllis arrived at Kigali airport to evacuate European nationals. The force totalled
1,100 troops of whom 400 were Belgian and 80 Italian." (Connaughton 1995, 12) Their
mission completed, the French left on 13 April, though not without France announcing
that the French/Belgian withdrawal would create a security vacuum in Rwanda. While in
Kigali, French troops assumed full responsibility for the airport control tower and routes into
the city from the airport, while the Belgians assumed responsibility for airport perimeter and
assembly point security.
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How can French military support be characterized up to the beginning of the
genocide? It was open, blatant and fell into three stages. In the first stage the support was
modest when there was a a strong belief that Habyarimana could easily defeat the invaders
from Rwanda. When the military situation became more balanced, the French increased its
support in order to facilitate a political solution by retaining a degree of balance. When the
military situation had deteriorated, and an RPF victory was forecast, France concentrated its
attention on a peaceful solution and a multilateral intervention force and began to initiate its
own withdrawal. Finally, the French did stop shipping arms once the genocide started,
contrary to what had been very widely alleged26 and what we ourselves wrote27 in the report
I co-authored with Astri Suhrke.28
2. France's Diplomatic Efforts to bring about Peace
As indicated above, French diplomatic activity grew as the regime's position
weakened. The diplomatic activity reached its apogee when the military commitment was
strongest but when the demise of the regime was expected, its military support declined.
The French involvement in Rwanda as the principle Western nation supporting
Habyarimana began in November of 1990 after the RPF had invaded and the Belgians,
because of domestic internal political splits, had retired from taking a leadership role. In
the second week of November, a French delegation led by the Minister of Cooperation and
Jean-Christophe Mitterand, the French African Advisor, met with various European and
African leaders to discuss the situation in Rwanda
The French were could not have been ignorant of the vast number of charges of
human rights abuses being levelled at the regime during this period. For example, in the
26 January 1991 - Le Monde, documents were cited about the circulation of anti-Tutsi
racist propaganda just 3 days after the Bagogwe (500-1000) massacre in Kinigi and just
before 300 Tutsi were massacred in Bigogwe. French policy did seem to follow the
pattern which Mitterand and the current Foreign Minister, then Chief of Staff for
Mitterand, insisted it was based upon29 - traditional francophonie and a desire to facilitate
a compromise with the RPF, but presumable on terms favourable to the government.
When the cease-fire again broke down again in the spring of 1991, France became
more active. As we had written in Adelman and Suhrke (1996), emphasis on the military
had been increasingly questioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. About mid-1991, it
was believed that the RPF might win militarily but not politically. The government could
not win militarily, though it might command the numbers to win politically. Hence, a
negotiated settlement was the best way for France to salvage its interests in Rwanda. The
October 1991 attempt by the Director of the Africa Bureau in the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs to mediate between GoR and RPF in Paris finally bore fruit in late spring of 1992,
when the two parties agreed in Paris on June 8 to open formal peace talks. The Director at
the time was M. Dijoud.
Possibly the French were piqued that a high ranking American official, Deputy
Assistance Secretary Hicks, had organized a meeting between RPF and GoR in Harare in
July. A subtle competition between Washington and Paris developed, driven on the
French side by a sense that diplomatic initiatives in Central Africa properly belonged to a
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French sphere. On 6-7 April 1992: negotiations began in Paris on the prospect of a
meeting between the two sides. Finally, the initiative bore fruit. From 6-8 June, France
began its efforts to directly mediate the conflict in a meeting between the Foreign Ministry
of the Rwandan government and a representative of the RPF in Paris. The parties agreed to
negotiate to end the conflict. Thus, the French were critical to beginning the Arusha peace
process.
Ostensibly in response to a slaughter of Tutsi, the RPF resumed fighting in
February of 1993. On 21 February, they once again unilaterally declared a cease-fire.
France had just denounced the RPF advance. France said that those advances were
threatening the peace. Although on 17 February, M. Marcel Débarge had assured French
that the international commission report on human rights violations would not be ignored,
he never publicly denounced the Habyarimana regime in the same way he castigated the
RPF. On 2 April, France informed the UN officially that the situation was deteriorating. He
claimed that the RPF were reoccupying zones from which they were to have withdrawn.
The French expressed their fear that there would be massacres and a humanitarian disaster.
France urged UN action. On the 6th of April, the Permanent Representative of France sent a
new mission to the Security Council to complain that the military withdrawal was not
progressing as agreed upon and that the political talks were deadlocked. He stressed the
urgency of the situation and urged the UN to take emergency action, specifically sending a
force to monitor the Rwanda/Uganda border. It was evident that the French government,
while genuinely trying to mediate the talks, remained biased towards the Habyarimana
regime.
France had an observer at the Arusha talks. I have already covered the French role
in my paper on the Arusha peace process. It is interesting that some commentators
criticize the French for not having taken a stronger, more leading role, in concert with
other states, to ensure that the provisions of Arusha were implemented.30 There is a
second type of criticism. The lack of commitment to the process is not formed in advance
but as a result of inadequacies in the agreement and distrust about the parties commitment
to it. “Because deep distrust of an opponent remains in place at the time an agreement is
set in motion, commitments made at the bargaining table may not be credible. Within-
group rivalry may come into full view after the agreement, the provisions of the
agreement may be vague and cause new tensions, and the world community may not be
prepared to give sustained support to peacekeeping and peacemaking.” (Lake and
Rothchild, Chapter 9: 224) There is a third, realist interpretation that argues that states
will not become engaged in enforcing a peace agreement unless their vital interests are at
stake.31 But whatever the explanation for the lack of commitment - the lack of effort or
will, the inadequacies of the agreement itself and the consequent reluctance of outsiders
to become involved, or the inherent lack of interest because of realpolitik - all three types
of commentator agree that there was not a party sufficiently engaged to assure that
coercive force was available to enforce the agreement. This was a s true of France, who
had become most closely engaged with Rwanda in the nineties, as it was of the other
Western states.
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From the end of the Arusha process, France was not the active supporter of
Rwanda, but its passive supporter. France became more of a bystander acting as a
Cassandra to warn of impending disaster, but without targeting or putting sufficient
pressure on its own client - the government of Rwanda. Though clearly supporting the
peace process and the effort to install a multi-party regime, France was still obsessed with
its own perception. The "Anglophone' invaders were the principle beneficiaries of the
agreement and France remained very insensitive to the Uncivil War being waged by the
extremists against the Tutsi population. When France recovered some degree of concern,
it was more to protect its own sense of honour than to protect the Tutsi or ensure that the
perpetrators of the genocide were totally stopped and caught to be tried for their crimes.
3.  Opération Turquoise (OT)
Security Council Resolution 929 of 22 June 1994 authorised France to mount a
two month unilateral humanitarian intervention into Rwanda until UNAMIR II became
operational. Was OT a smoke screen to facilitate the Hutu withdrawal from Rwanda in
August 1994,32 or was the mission a public relations exercise to mitigate the
embarrassment of supporting a genocidal regime? Or was it a genuine if somewhat
belated effort to save remaining Tutsi from the continuing onslaught of the genocide?
According to its public rationale, OT was undertaken for two purposes. One was
humanitarian - to stop the genocide and save civilian lives. The second was political,
since France had traditional obligations and a loyalty to protect its compatriots, but also a
responsibility to the UN and the goals of a peaceful resolution of conflicts. Further, the
initiative was to be undertaken within a multilateral UN mandate with the following
boundary conditions: limited engagement and avoidance, if possible, of any ground
forces engagement.
In fact, the political motivations in France were multiple, for France was not a
homogeneous actor. There were, in fact, many different voices in Paris, and some of
those different voices had a hand in the decision. As Connaughton (1995) summarized
them, "There was a political division in Paris. In the planning stage, many of the military
firmly believed that they were going into Kigali to comfort and defeat the Tutsis, 'the
Khmer Noir', and return to Rwanda to the status quo ante. President Mitterand
represented a groundswell of humanitarian opinion which had seized itself with the
notion of hundreds of orphans to rescue and care for. The Foreign and Defence Ministries
viewed Turquoise as an opportunity for them to recapture foreign policy from the
President." (Connaughton, net, section2, 10)
The size of the force was disproportionate and extremely well-armed for a rescue
operation. Unless one takes into account the forces needed if France became involved in
a firefight in spite of its peaceful intentions. The force included 2555 French and 350
Francophone troops from seven different countries including Senmegal. There were 12
Jaguar and Mirage F-1s as well as armoured personnel carriers and other equipment.
However, these were kept back in Goma, Zaire, the staging area for the operation. It must
be remembered that only half the force ever landed in Rwanda. The force was instructed
only to use force to defend itself, defend a protected population, deal with mission
obstruction or if in a conflict situation with refugees.. Further, that force was to be used
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only as a last resort. As further evidence that the force was not there to engage in conflict,
the troops were ordered not to wear helmets or anti-shrapnel jackets.
The best example of the evidence for the peaceful intention of the force was the
operation to rescue and evacuate 700 orphans and 50 civilians from Butare. Kagame's
version of that event, and the brief firefight with the RPF outside Butare, as recorded by
Gourevitch, is as follows.
"during our approach to Butare…I received from General Dallaire of UNAMIR a
message from the French general in Goma telling me that we should not enter Butare.
They were trying to tell me there would be a fight.".Kagame told Dallaire that "he would
not tolerate such a provoacation and such arrogance on the part of the French." Then, he
recalled, "I told the troops to change course, to move to Butare now. They arrived in the
evening. I told them just to surround the town and stay put. I didn't want them to get
involved in a firefight at night. So they took positions and waited until morning. When
our troops entered, they found that the French had secretly moved out to Gikongoro" - to
the west. "But then, through Dallaire, they asked permission to return for some Catholic
orphans they wanted to take away. I cleared it. The French came back, but they didn't
know that we had already secured the route from Gikongoro to Butare. We had set a long
ambush, nearly two companies along the road."
The French convoy consisted of about twenty-five vehicles, and as it left Butare,
Kagame's forces sprang their trap and ordered the French to submit each vehicle to
inspection. "Our interest was to make sure none of these people they were taking were
FAR or militias. The French refused. Their jeeps were mounted with machine guns, so
they turned them on our troops as a sign of hostility. When the soldiers in the ambush
realized there was going to be a confrontation, they came out, and a few fellows who had
rocket-propelled grenade launchers targeted the jeeps. When the French soldiers saw that,
they were all instructed to point their guns upward. And they did. They allowed our
soldiers to carry out the inspection." In one of the last vehicles, Kagame said, two
government soldiers were found. One ran away and was shot dead, and Kagame added,
"Maybe they killed the other one, too." At the sound of the shooting, the French vehicles
that had been cleared to go ahead turned on the road and began  firing from afar, but the
exchange lasted less than a minute." (Gourevitch 1998, 158-9)
From other accounts of the incident, the report is very factual in its details, but
filtered through Kagame's vision and perspective. Set aside from Kagame's totally
justifiable anger at the French for supporting the Habyarimana regime that had been
engaged in the wanton killing of Tutsi for the last four years. Set aside the
presumptuousness of the French entering another country to save its citizens after
allowing most of the Tutsi to killed by forces it formerly supported. Set aside that the
French could have chosen to support Kagame's armies to stop the wanton killing much
faster than even the French, and much more extensively. Note, instead, the following.
When the French asked Kagame not to enter Butare, Kagame's interprets their request to
mean that, "they were trying to tell me there would be a fight. It is Kagame who prepares
his troops for a firefight, in spite of the prior agreement with the French and the fact that
they had asked for his permission, through Dallaire, and he had given it. It is Kagame
who prepares a surprise attack on the French. Kagame does not mention that in addition
to the nuns, there were 700 orphans and 50 civilians in the military column that the
French had taken under there protection and who would have suffered enormous
casualties if a firefight had broken out. Kagame does not say, but we know from other
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sources, that the French soldiers were not wearing helmets or anti-shrapnel jackets. They
were travelling in jeeps and not in armoured personnel carriers. And, according to
Kagame's own words, two ostensible FAR soldiers were finally allegedly found in the
last car. Assuming they were really FAR soldiers, Kagame makes it clear to Gourevitch
that they were shot. There was no attempt evidently to capture them. In contrast, in
Kagame's own description, there is every bit of evidence that the French were trying their
best to avoid a conflict.
More seriously, what if an extensive firefight would have broken out? Ignore for a
moment the large number of children and civilian casualties that would have resulted.
Kagame would have fallen right into the FAR trap and, inadvertently enlisted the French
in combat fully on the side of the FAR. 33 Even if Kagame eventually would have won,
the remaining Tutsi in the south would have been in even greater danger than they
already were. And the French might well have resorted to the use of their extensive air
power to wreck havoc on Kagame's military.
This suggests that, given Kagame's paranoia and understandable distrust of the
French, the French have to be applauded for their skills in diplomacy in handling such a
tough situation. Further, they did save lives - perhaps only 10,000 to 25,000.34 Further,
because of the French  presence, a good part of the Hutu populartion in the south did not
become refugees in Zaire to add to the vast number already there and the additional
economic burden on the international community. True, the French allowed some Tusti to
be killed who were not in the main collection centres. True, the ex-FAR and militia units
were not arrested.35 True, the army was allowed to escape freely into Zaire. But the
French had no mandate to arrest genocidists and no mandate to prevent the FAR soldiers
and militia from seeking temporary sanctuary in the south and then in Zaire. It was a
protection mandate only.
This suggests that OT was truly a humanitarian mission, even if Prunier (1995) is
correct in suggesting that the motives for the mission were French pride and fear of loss
of their honour and others have indicated that the French remained biased towards the
side that produced the genocidists.36 As General Anyidoho, the commander of the
Ghanian peacekeeping forces, summarized his assessment, "Within UNAMIR itself, the
French proposal [for a humanitarian operation in June of 1994] was received with mixed
feelings. While some of us supported the French initiative, others opposed the idea on the
grounds that such an intervention could only worsen the situation. This French operation
proved to be the right decision in the end."37
IV THE UNITED STATES ROLE IN THE RWANDA GENOCIDE
Preamble
In reviewing the role of the United States, and in a major contrast with the
analysis of the French role, there is virtually no controversy about the facts of the case.
There is some controversy over explaining why the United States did what it did, or,
more accurately, why it failed to do what it should have done, and a great deal of
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controversy over the evaluation of that failure. But there is an overwhelming consensus
that the Rwanda genocide represented a failure in American foreign policy and, further, a
great deal of consensus on most of the steps that led to that failure.
There are, of course, simplistic explanations of the American role. The current
Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, is one of the most reliable
simplifiers. In testimony, in speeches, in briefings to the press when the issue hit the
headlines again with the Belgian enquiry or when Gourevitch's articles first appeared in
the New Yorker, Annan blamed the failure on lack of political will by the international
community. The most important player in the international community is the United
States. He has done this ever since he was head of U.N. peacekeeping operations during
the genocide. For Annan, the explanation for that lack of political will is what I and Astri
Suhrke had dubbed the Shadow of Somalia. According to Annan, much of that will had
been sapped by the failure of the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Somalia when, in
October 1993, 18 American Rangers were killed in an attack on the stronghold of warlord
Mohammed Mohammed Farah Aidid. The trauma of Americans watching their boys
being dragged half-naked through the streets of Mogadishu destroyed their stomach for
any future engagement of this type.
As a result of that fiasco, President Clinton later announced that all American
forces would be withdrawn. Under pressure from Congress, Clinton set stringent
conditions on future U.N. peacekeeping operations (Presidential Decision Directive 25,
PDD-25) - measures that ruled out rapid international response to crises like the Rwandan
genocide. These were signed into effect one month after the Rwanda genocide began,
though the conditions of that directive governed policy before that time. As Ambassador
Madelaine Albright testified when she was still the US Ambassador to the UN and when
the genocide had been in full swing for almost a month, the US would only enter a
multinational peacekeeping operation if specific criteria were met. Those were: "whether
there was a real threat to international peace, clear objectives, and an identifiable end
point."38 The latter referred to an exit strategy.
On the surface, this appeared to restore American policy to its customary foundation
in serving the national interest boundaried by prudential concerns when acting on those
interests.39 As Vaccaro articulated that policy, the US strongly opposed new interventions
and had become skeptical of mounting coercive peace operations after the Somali
debacle. Vaccaro quoted Anthony Lake’s (NSA) announcement of PDD-25: “neither we
nor the international community have either the mandate nor the resources nor the
possibility of resolving every conflict of this kind.”40 This view was projected onto the
international community at large: “The international community seemed willing to help
other countries resolve conflicts, but only at low cost and at the request of the local
parties to those conflicts. To suppress genocide in Rwanda, coercive operations would
have been required.”  (375)
In other words, the emotional trauma was explained to be a product of straying
from the traditional foundations of American foreign policy. Based on the priority of
national interest, the US acted within the boundaries of what could be done, what could
be afforded to be done, what could be efficaciously done, and what could be done at low
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risk to the lives of American soldiers. Ivo Daalder stressed the no risk factor and
explained this as a shift from multilateralism and towards the priority of domestic policy
issues influenced by Clinton's presidential campaign. This move was motivated by two
factors, first the president’s electoral platform which asserted that foreign policy was to
be subordinate to domestic concerns, and, second, that the Mogadishu syndrome resulted
in a “no casualty” approach to foreign policy. “The impetus for the administration’s
endorsement of multilateralism and its efforts to strengthen the UN’s capacity to conduct
peace operations was partly attributable to this political imperative. Multilateral peace
operations, it was thought, offered a way for the US to remain engaged internationally
without having to bear alone all the burdens of international leadership. But as domestic
and congressional criticism of multilateralism and the UN mounted in the wake of the
Somali debacle, the administration chose to join its critics rather than defend its policy,
believing that in so doing it could better protect its domestic political agenda.” (61-62)
This interpretation of American policy has been questioned on two grounds, neither
of which challenges the accuracy of the realist explanation. One points to its inadequacy in
reflecting how the United States actually behaves. America simply does not act on the basis
of narrow national self interest in foreign policy. This was the case when America diverted
its policy towards a multilateralist approach before the Somali episode. But it was also the
case immediately after the promulgation of PDD-25 when American forces went abroad in
the humanitarian effort to help the Rwandan Hutu refugees who had crossed the
Rwanda/Zaire border in such massive numbers. As R.M. Connaughton phrased it, "As a
result of their interpretation of the Somalia episode, the US Congress adopted a view that it
did not like UN Peacekeeping. In April 1994, when effective action might have achieved
something in Rwanda, both the executive and the legislative agreed that there was no US
national interest in Rwanda. However, the unfolding TV tragedy of the post-Goma period
had a political impact which was not evident in pre-Goma when the worst incidents had
occurred." (1995 for ODI, UK, on internet, p 5of13, section 2)
There is also a normative critique. If the US acts only out of a narrow sense of self-
interest, "small, vulnerable countries may draw the conclusion that the family of free
countries is no family at all and that real friends lie elsewhere; and because the strong
democracies are weakened by the resulting appearance of hypocritical self-interest that
begins to gnaw at their moral (and thus their political) credibility." (Tony Judt, "What Are
American Interests," NYRB XLII:15 5 October 1995, p. 37.) In other words, acting on self
interest is not only morally questionable, it does not even serve those self interests. Even the
implementers of PDD 25 admitted that the Presidential Directive was a catastrophe.41
Before taking on the issues of explanation and normative evaluation, I will
review, reasonably quickly and concisely, the factual analysis of the US role and
contribution to the genocide. As I indicated, there has been a general concurrence about
these factors, one that has been helped by America's willingness to be forthcoming about
its motives and policies. For purposes of economy of space, I will review them by
category rather than chronologically. 42
The Categories of American Failure in the Rwandan Genocide
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A. Will or Guts
Jane Holl, Executive Director of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly
Conflict, at the 1998 December forum of the Council on Foreign Relations suggested that
the phrase 'political will' be banished from the lexicon of political science. It lacked any
content, she insisted. Certainly, as used by many, the phrase is reduced to banality. To see
the Mogadishu Syndrome as a lack of political will or to read America's refusal to take
action on the genocide as a failure of political will is simply misleading. The US
administration had a great deal of will in standing up to all the pressures when it refused
to endorse any action. This may have been misguided. Its stance may have been
shortsighted. It was certainly immoral. But it was also not a problem of lack of will.
Political will is divisible into two aspects. In one, it is the capacity to mobilize
energy and resources to tackle a particular task or to insist on using its energy for other
tasks. In many conflicts in which America saw itself primarily as a bystander occupying a
ringside seat, such as initially in former Yugoslavia where the United States saw the EU
as the major outside player, the US was the only party that demonstrated it could get its
act together once it resolved to do so. One may disagree with the results, but that
disagreement should not be converted into a charge that the Americans lacked political
will, unless this simply means that Anerica had resolved not to act in that way, a peculiar
use of a lack of will. That type of political will is the ability and resolve to mobilize its
energy to focus on one problem rather than another.
There is another aspect to political will. It is the ability to use coercive power to
make others bend to your will. It is other rather than self-directed. And coercive force or
the threat to use coercive force on another is the exclusive expression of that aspect of
political will. The creative energy aspect of political will can be identified with a lion
tamer who separates the lions and the tigers and gets them to perform. The coercive
power aspect of political will means that one acts as if one is a tiger or a lion.
Will is the capability of doing things, of mustering one's own energy, sometimes
to control the destructive energy of another, or applying that energy in the form of
coercion to limit the destructiveness of another's energy or to turn one's own energy into a
destructive force. An agent lacks political will if the agent clearly decides on following
one course of action and proves incapable of following through. There is a lack of
political will when there is a gap between our determinations and our actions. When this
results from another overpowering one's own energy, then there is a lack of will of a
different order.
In none of the cases of American failure can one find a lack of American political
will. It is perfectly understandable why Jane Holl wants to ban the phrase for it has been
so misused and abused. Nevertheless, as a Canadian, the category is crucial. In the
operation we initiated in Zaire in 1996, we demonstrated a lack of political will in both
senses. We decided to do something and lacked the capacity to do it on our own or in
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concert with others. When we had accumulated those resources, we failed to follow
through.
Americans are not gutless. Quite the reverse. But American leaders can be
heartless and stupid. What America lacked was not will but heart and intelligence.
B. Heart or Compassion
In virtually all countries, including those countries most closely identified with a
commitment to development in the third world, such as the Scandinavian countries,
Canada, the Netherlands, Switzerland, there was an indifference to the plight of the Tutsi
refugees from the 1959-1966 period. Further, within Rwanda, these countries turned a
blind eye to the discrimination in Rwanda based on the use of identity cards.43 In the
early nineties, this indifference, with some notable exceptions of Belgium and Canada in
a literally half-hearted and belated way, focussed on a totally inadequate response to the
trial runs of ethnic killing for the genocide that developed.44 The same indifference
emerged when the actual genocide started and countries mobilized resources to get out
Westerners, but abandoned loyal locals who had worked for them or whom they were
even protecting. Instead, these Rwandese were left to be slaughtered.
The indifference manifested itself on a variable scale when it came to the racial
hatred and encouragement of ethnic cleansing promulgated on Radio Mille Collines. No
country tried to jam the broadcasts. No country engaged in alternative broadcasting
targeting the racists. No country even formally protested. In almost all of these areas, the
United States shared the same heartlessness as most of the rest of the nations. But in the
area of radio broadcasting, Ambassador Rawlson, the US Ambassador in Kigali, told me
that he listened to Radio Mille Collines because it played the best music and was the
liveliest station. He did not take the racist rantings seriously because they were so
outrageous.
Heartlessness is evident when you do not even feel that which hurts or is intended
to hurt others. But it is also evident in another aspect when one party - either an
individual or a nation as a whole - is insensitive to how others are affected by one's
actions. The world community was insensitive to the commitment that the parties had
made at the Arusha Accords and the expectations they had of the role of the
peacekeepers. Even before the agreement was signed, the United States especially
insisted on watering down the commitment of the UN. After the Arusha Accords were
signed, the fulfillment of that commitment was continually short changed in the numbers
of troops provided, the quality of troops, the equipment made available, and even in the
bureaucratic administrative nightmare in which UNAMIR was enmeshed. The
peacekeepers never received a budget until two days before the genocide started. Further,
many countries, but especially the United States, were insensitive to the hopes that
UNAMIR had given to the local community that they would be protected by these
peacekeepers. This insensitivity was not expressed by the average soldier or officer on
the ground but by politicians in the various relevant capitals around the world.45 It is with
regard to this insensitivity that, with the exception of Great Britain, the United States
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stood out as exceptionally insensitive. This was evident in the US refusal to brand the
activities in Rwanda as genocide lest they obligate themselves to act when they were
determined not to become involved militarily or financially.
As Herman Cohen: stated in testimony before the Belgian Commisiion of Enquiry, 7
July 1998:
"Après la Somalie, les Etats-Unis, surtout le chef de la sécurité nationale à la
Maison Blanche, étaient très réticents à toute nouvelle opération dans un
pays sous-développé. Il était même hors de question d'envoyer des soldats
africains qui étaient prêts à partir pour le Rwanda. Le 1er mai, Ahmed Salim
Salim, secrétaire général de l'OUA, avait déjà des promesses de 5 000
soldats africains prêts à partir, mais ils avaient besoin d'un appui logistique.
Les Etats-Unis ont refusé de parler d'un génocide qui aurait des
obligations juridiques."
Lest Herman Cohen be considered an exceptional voice in the administration
because of his close concern with Africa, Warren Christopher, Secretary of State, accepted
the obligation to intervene in accordance with the 1948 Genocide Convention in his
testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 6/30/94. As he said in that
testimony, the Administration did not want the term genocide used lest the public express a
desire to intervene "in a situation in which the Administration did not want to intervene."
(New York Times A8, 6/10/94)
But the height of American heartlessness came when Americans wore their hearts on
their sleeves most distinctly - when the mass of refugees crossed at Goma in mid 1994. The
Joint Chiefs of  Staff of the American Armed Forces had just held a press conference to
indicate that the US would not be sending any troops to Zaire to deal with the plight of the
Hutu refugees. The result was a cascade of faxes, e-mails and telephone messages to the
White House. By 10:00 a.m. the next morning, President Clinton reversed policy. Three
days later, American troops were being flown to the Great Lakes region.
Does this not indicate an excess of compassion rather heartlessness? Yes if one
forgets that among the refugees were genocidists. The insensitivity was the failure to
distinguish between the genuine refugees and the killers and to make sure that the former
received aid while the latter were arrested. Instead, driven by the politics of sentiment rather
than a compassion which morally discriminates, aid went in droves to assist the refugees.
And it did so in a context which allowed the genocidists to gain control of the camps and
steal the excess food aid, sell it again and use the funds to regroup and continue the genocide
on another day.
C. Mind
There are two ways in which the mind applies itself to political problems. In one
way, it acts on the basis of instrumental rationality or prudence. A primary outlet for this
instrumental rationality is the use of money or material resources to influence a situation.
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Up until 1990, the United States followed the general Western pattern of allocating aid
and encouraging the creation of an elite dependent on that aid. (Uvin 1998) By the early
nineties, the US had introduced aid conditionality in a serious way. Its first use was
economic - to pressure states to restructure economically and open their states to foreign
investment and to reduce the protection for their home markets.
(T)he U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), listed in detail
their own conditions. The conditions of a 1991 grant, for example (officially
termed 'Production and Marketing Policy Reform') read as follows: 'prior to
the first ($15 million) tranche, the GOR [government of Rwanda] will
replace the existing foreign exchange allocation and licensing system with
an interim managed system, to ease the shock of decontrol. Other conditions
precedent to the first tranche are to remove controls on price and profit
margins (except for monopolies), abolish fixed prices for most goods and
services, and reduce tariffs, custom duties, and import surcharges.
Conditions to the second tranche include implementation of an open
licensing system and a comprehensive review of export policies."46
By 1992, economic conditionality was beginning to be used for political purposes.
But not to ensure that Tutsi were not discriminated against or even to make aid conditional
on the end of massacres. Herman Cohen made aid conditional on Uganda pressuring the
RPF to come to the negotiating table and stop the fighting. 47 Whether circumstances, RPF
policy or American pressure was the cause, with a bit more diplomacy and a bit more time
and few new military initiatives, eventually the parties came to the negotiating table in an
apparent effort to pursue peace seriously.
If material influence was used selectively in 1992 and with questionable
effectiveness, it was not used once the parties were at Arusha. Cohen did not try to
pressure the RPF or use economic incentives to get the RPF to modify what the
Americans considered unbending policies. The United States disagreed with the RPF
policy of excluding the CDR from the Broad Based Transitional Government (BBTG)
and in the strong position the RPF took in insisting on reserving 50% of the officer corps
of the new integrated army for its own people.48 But it expressed that disagreement and
did not try to muscle the RPF into changing its mind or blackmail the RPF with economic
threats or tempt it with economic goodies.
When it came to the funding of the peacekeeping force authorized by the UN,
material influence was an important factor in sewing the seeds for the failure of
UNAMIR. In the UN, the United States used its political weight to insist, even before the
Arusha Accords were signed, that the peacekeeping force provided would have a very
restricted mandate and would never be involved in directly confronting the local
population. Secondly, when the size and composition of the force went to the Security
Council, it was clear that the United States attitude was a limiting factor in what was
recommended by UNDPKO.49 Thirdly, once authorized the United States influence on
the UN budgeting process meant that the resources for UNAMIR were not forthcoming.
There was no budget for the helicopters or the armoured personnel carriers. The right
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wing American Republican Congress was blamed with its anti-UN bias.50 Thus, although
the UNAMIR Force Commander, Romeo Dallaire, called for an increase in his troops,
there was no support in New York for decisive action against the genocide. The main
concerns were protecting the troops, evacuating the ex-pats, and possibly facilitating
negotiations. The troops were given specific instructions that they were not to engage in
rescuing civilian who were in mortal danger.
This frugal approach was equally true of UNAMIR II which was authorized to
provide domestic protection. 51As Alison des Forges phrased it in her testimony before the
Senate Subcommittee, 5 May 1998:
"At first, the U.S. delayed implementation of the decision as it sought
guarantees that the operation would conform to Presidential Decision
Directive 25, (PDD 25), the just established policy concerning U.S.
support for peacekeeping forces. After lengthy discussions resulted in
clearing the plans for the operation, the U.N. experienced much difficulty
in getting nations to contribute troops and then in getting other nations to
contribute the equipment and supplies needed for the troops. The U.S.
required seven weeks to negotiate a contract for delivering armored
personnel carriers--a period needed to arrange the desired terms "for
maintenance and spare parts"--but other nations also contributed little, if
anything, or contributed it slowly. The U.K., for example, came up with
only fifty trucks. Such delays were not unusual for mustering U.N.
operations. What was unusual was the context."
However, stupidity is not just a matter of imprudent actions based on instrumental
miscalculations. It is also a matter of failing to develop the capacity to gather, synthesize
and analyze knowledge and translate that analysis into policy alternatives to be chosen
based on that analysis in relationship to some standardized and broadly shared norms.
This was by far the greatest failure of the United States. Unfortunately, the United States
was not alone and does not deserve the dubious credit of single-handedly52 permitting the
genocide to succeed and most of the genocidists to escape. But it does deserve the
criticism that it failed in its leadership responsibilities which only the United States holds.
For realism does not only take self interests into account. It uses that leadership to forge
and enhance alliances as one of the core elements in fulfilling that self interest. As Barry
Steiner has written in his excellent draft manuscript [and I trust he will forgive me for
quoting from a draft], "Great power concert linkages were importantly built upon the ability
of the major states to cooperate on local small power conflict issues." 53 (p. 315)
To do that, great states must possess superior knowledge, not only of facts, not
only of the principles behind the facts, not only of the implications of those facts and
principles, but the normative framework for translating those implications into choices.
The United States failed its leadership responsibilities on every single level. For instead
of being driven by the humanitarian pragmatism that is at the heart of that great country,
the United States has most recently been directed by a pair of horses veering in opposite
directions, one a wild horse maddened by a false, narrow and misbegotten ideology
which parades its colours in the name of individualism, and the other an affectionate,
cuddly and well-disposed dog that has visions that it is a horse. When a country cannot
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see right from wrong when evil stares it in the face, when that country plays with
language to hide its moral blindness, that country is stupid. And the United States, and
most of the countries it purports to lead - as well as the United Nations - shared in that
stupidity.
And the stupidity is all the greater when we now know that those countries had far
more evidence to anticipate the ensuing genocide than Astri Suhrke and I pointed out in
1996. We had been allowed to see a study circulated in January of 1993 by an
unassuming analyst in the American government that predicted the likelihood of large
scale massacres which was estimated could total a half a million people, a study that was
presumably ignored in the euphoria of Arusha. But the explanation for ignoring the study
goes deeper. The United States was uninterested when the RPF invaded Rwanda. It
became mildly engaged in the process leading up to Arusha. Then it combined
uninterstedness with mild engagement to adopt a disinterested stance at Arusha itself. In
this, the United States was well served by its ambassador in Kigali. The affairs in
Rwanda were at most worthy only of peripheral attention to the United States.
The path leading up to the greatest moral test the United States has faced since
both World War II and the War Against the Jews was fast approaching. The United States
was preparing to fail what would be the greatest test of its contemporary leadership and
the one easiest to pass. It failed that test with spectacular moral obtuseness.
Between the signing of the Arusha Accords and the onset of the cataclysm, radio
and newspapers in Rwanda incited the Hutu to neutralize their enemies and accomplices
for all time. These media warnings adumbrated the approaching catastrophe. UNAMIR
and every embassy54 collected information on the arms being stored, on the militias being
trained, on the massacre trial runs, on the assassinations, and, most of all, on the Akazu,
on Hutu Power, which would mastermind the genocide. Dallaire's famous January 11th
cable was but the tip of a vast array of information that seemed to bring it all together by
specifically mentioning that every Tutsi in Kigali was targeted for elimination at the
anticipated rate of 1000 every twenty minutes. Moderate Rwandan army officers had
already informed Dallaire and several ambassadors that massacres were being planned
aimed at the Tutsi.
The United Nations served as the mirror of that moral blindness, not because it
ignored the cable as just one of many warnings it received, but because it developed a
deliberate blindness to all the information that was accumulating. 55 Further, it later used
that same multiplicity of information as its excuse for its inaction. In fact, at the time the
UN knew the information was hot. The UN placed the cable in a separate Black Box and
not in the regular files. An individual who became obsessed by the implications of that
cable was exiled to the boonies. Then when the international body first initiated its
investigation on what went wrong, UN officials first denied that any information existed
in its files pointing to an impending genocide. Then when the existence of the cable and
copies were circulated, UN officials dismissed its significance.56 And it did not recognize
its failure to collect, to analyze and to provide well-thought out options to all the
members of the Security Council based on full information. Instead, the UN leadership
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refused to share in that responsibility. The fault belonged to their members for whom
they were only loyal servants.57
In that respect, and in contrast to the leaders of the United States who have owned
up to their failures, the United Nations reflected what was worst in its members not what
was best. For the officials in the United Nations on their own, without consulting the
Security Council, denied Dallaire the right to seek out the arms caches and verify the
credibility of the informant.58 Further, Dallaire was instructed to inform Habyarimana
about the information on the preparations underway for a genocide.59 The irony, of
course, was that the government of Rwanda was a member of the Security Council during
this period and observed the unwillingness of the great powers to take any action. 60 Thus
they knew they could extend the range and extent of the genocide with impunity. Further,
the Secretary General until the end of April when he changed his tune dramatically and
characterized the massacres as a genocide, previously misrepresented  them as the
products of Hutu/Tutsi sectarian violence in his press releases, documents which are not
included in the UN official record.
The United States has been accused of single-handedly ensuring the demise of
UNAMIR. It certainly played a leading role.61 But the UN Secretary-General himself
admitted to reporting to the Security Council on 12 April that the mandate of UNAMIR
was untenable with the withdrawal of the Belgian troops and without a replacement of
forces of equal caliber. (The Blue Book, p. 40) Further, the Belgians not only withdrew,
but campaigned for the withdrawal of all the forces, even though this ran contrary to the
recommendations of the Belgian commanding officer in the field.62 The UK led the
proposal for total withdrawal. The UN Secretary-General insisted that he opposed
withdrawal of UNAMIR as neither advisable nor feasible.63 In fact, the Secretary-General
opposed withdrawal at that time. The thrust of his advice was to retain a remnant of
UNAMIR for use in mediating between the parties. The S-G appeared to take at their
word that the leaders of the coup were committed to Arusha and in establishing a BBTG
in cooperation with the RPF64 while they proceeded to accelerate the rate of the genocide.
The United States, with the UN leadership and many other countries following
close behind, were blind to the extensive information providing a basis for early warning
of genocide,. They were blind to the nature of the power grab. They were blind to the
potential for utilizing an internal potential opposition and moderates, many of them in
official positions and in the army. These officials maintained a single-minded focus on
peacekeeping and peacemaintaining versus protecting civilians, and hoped for the
possibility for mediation in a context in which mediation was a pipedream.
Ironically, the small force retained in Rwanda for purposes of mediation was
instructed not to take an active role in protecting Rwandan civilians. In this, the UN
officials provided the leadership rather than the US. Yet, through the shenanigans of
Dallaire, the force remained at twice the size authorized. And it did manage to protect an
estimated 20,000 - 25,000 Rwandans during the course of the genocide. But it was the US
that led the contingent deliberately obfuscating that a genocide was taking place, only
reluctantly acceding to referring to the massacres as genocide-like. And when the events
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were recognized for what they were, the United States made a perfect marriage with the
UN bureaucracy in finding excuses to delay the deployment and equipping of UNAMIR
II until that major wave of the genocide had effectively ended.
Evaluation and Explanation
I have drawn the conclusion that those who wish to blame the United States for
single-handedly failing to intervene and stop the genocide are wrong. There were plenty
of others around to share the blame. But the US did play a leading role. Further, I have
argued that this was not because the US lacked political will, but because its will was
directed elsewhere. Instead I have suggested it was because the US lacked heart and
intelligence rather than will, perhaps a more pointed accusation.
There are too many people in the United States who are both compassionate and
intelligent to accept such a charge easily. It might help if the US role as a spoiler in the
effort to stop the genocide was explained. Certainly, the shadow of Somalia played a
primary role. But it did so because the United States largely distinguishes what is of
primary interest to the nation based on geo-political and strategic requirements alone
when its own citizens make no such distinction. That is why the United States officials
were afraid to brand the events as genocide. They did not want to become involved. The
public might demand America's involvement. In other words, there is a discrepancy
between what the public-at-large regards as of central concern in foreign policy and what
a good part of the policy establishment takes to be central. The result is that the United
States is led into a number of foreign policy intra-state roles through the media of
sentimental politics rather than through information, analysis and strategic planning. The
United States is a democracy which, in foreign policy, distrusts its own public.
Further, to the degree the US becomes involved in peripheral areas, it sees
disinterestedness and commitment as opposites. The US leadership believes to the degree
it becomes interested - as France was - it loses its sense of balance and becomes
ineffective as a mediator.65 The problem is that whereas there must be a sense of balance
in inter state wars to conduct mediation, balance is not morally permissible when one side
is engaged in genocide.
The effect of both these observations is to recognize that moral commitment
requires emotional commitment. But emotional commitment cannot be the basis for
foreign policy initiatives. On the other hand, without such an emotional involvement, the
United States remained uninvolved and only became committed when the US public was
aroused over the plight of the Hutu refugees in Goma.
In this respect, the United States stands in strong contrast to France in which
cultural rather than emotional identity is a primary basis of foreign involvement.66 The
problem is that the United States not only demonstrated heartlessness and stupidity in
attending to Rwanda, it failed its most important duty in foreign affairs - the
responsibility of knowing itself.
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FOOTNOTES
                                                                
1 I originally planned to write a paper on five states and had included the United Kingdom and
Canada. However, time and space limitations made me drop both sections. The material on the United
kingdom is incorporated in a few other places; the UK was not one of the significant players so a separate
section would have been very short. However, Canada had a long and intimate history with Rwanda.
Canadian priests and academics were the founders of Rwanda's university at Butare. Rwanda was a
favourite development country for CIDA., the Canadian International Development Agency. Finally,
Canadians played major roles as peacekeepers in general and in Rwanda in particular. General Baril,
currently the head of Canada's armed forces, was the military adviser in the United Nations Department of
Peacekeeping Operations during the period in which UNAMIR was created and deployed and when the
genocide was at its height from April to July of 1994. Brigadier-General Romeo Dallaire was the Force
Commander of UNAMIR. However, instead of incorporating the Canadian material in this paper, I have
left it as a separate paper.
2 The refugee admissions procedure in Belgium is based on the Minister of the Interior determining the
admissibility of a claim on both formal grounds (the timeliness of the application, the possession of valid
travel documents, whether the claimant stayed in a safe third country over three months, etc.) and
substantive grounds so that the Minister may determine a claim to be inadmissable because it is manifestly
unfounded. (For a detailed explanation of the Belgian refugee determination system, cf. Dirk Vanheule's
article on the Belgium system in, Who Is A Refugee: A Comparative Case Law Study, Jean-Yves Carlier et
al, editors, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997) During the period 1 April 1994, just before the
genocide firestorm broke, and 31 August 1997, 1730 claims for refugee status from Rwandans were filed
with the Minister. Of these, the Minister determined that 783 or 45% were deemed to be admissable. Of the
876 rejected, 824 were appealed to a refugee appeals board. Of these 824, the Appeals Board deemed that
702 (85%) to be admissable. Thus, of the original 1730 claims filed, 1485 were deemed to be admissable
claims.  Of these, 974 (66%) were recognized, 77 (4%) were rejected, and 425 (30%) waited a decision.
This extremely high acceptance rate contrasts with an average acceptance rate of 8% from other nationals.
The largest controversy over these refugee admissions concerned the large number of alleged perpetrators
of genocide who had been admitted as refugees.
3 The information available to the Belgian government concerning the impending genocide was even more
than Astri Suhrke and I had indicated in the report on early warning and conflict management that we had
co-authored for the international community with respect to the Rwanda genocide  Early Warning and
Conflict Management, Volume 2 of The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from
the Rwanda Experience, Copenhagen: DANIDA, 1996.
4 Family members, the media and concerned Parliamentarians put pressure on the government to set up the
commission and was backed by a public petition with 200,000 signatures.
5 Belgian Senate, Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry into the Events in Rwanda, December 6, 1997.
6 For most of the insights gained in this section analyzing the role of Belgium, I am most grateful to my
conversations over the last three years with Philp Verwimp, a doctoral candidate in Development
Economics at the University of Leuven, Belgium and, more recently, a visiting fellow in the Genocide
Studies Program at Yale University. He and Els Vanheusden, a lawyer in Brussels Bar, Belgium, made
available to me an as yet unpublished paper dealing with the Belgian role in Zaire in 1996 which reviews
the results of the enquiry as a background to their analysis.
7 In the year preceding the period of the Commission of Enquiry, a number of scandals broke in the press
concerning Belgium's failed development projects.
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8 In my estimation, the most heinous of its acts was the reification of the Hutu/Tutsi divide with the
introduction of identity cards in 1933/34 to the Hutu (85% of the population), Tusi (14%) and Twa (1%).
9 In addition to the Senate Report, cf. Robert Brusten and Nelson Bindariye, Les Politiques des ONG
Belges au Rwanda de 1969 à 1994 . Brussels: ATOL/South Research, étude commandité oar le NCOs, 1997
and Peter Uvin, Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda , West Hartford, Connecticut:
Kumarian Press, 1998, esp. pp. 87-96.
10 The Belgian economy had already been stagnant for several years when the coffee prices crashed in
1988. Combined with poor weather conditions, the crash contributed to a dramatic decline in economic
productivity, dropping 5.7% in 1989. Adding to the problem, the budgetary deficit rose in 1989 to 8% of the
GDP.  In the preceding years, the domestic debt had also quadrupled.  Net reserves in the same period had
fallen from five to two months. Unemployment rates also rose, in part because of the impact of the influx of
75,000 Hutu refugees who escaped to Rwanda from the massacres in neighbouring Burundi in 1988. On 15
January 1989, Habyarimana announced his new five year plan. It was to be based on four guiding principles:
discipline, cooperation, transparency, and solidarity.
11. Rwanda received a large volume of non-military aid from several donors throughout the 1990-3 period. Rwanda had been rewarded
in the eighties for its perceived commitment to the rule of law and for delivering results in its partnership with aid projects. With a
traditionally efficient local administration and functioning infrastructure, Rwanda's ability to absorb aid had partly accounted for the
large inflow of aid in previous years. In the early 1990's, it was still a country where foreign aid bureaucraices could reasonably
disburse money.
42. Under the guidance of two "old Rwanda hands", in the Ministry of Cooperation and its implementing agency (ADCD), Belgium
had chosen Rwanda for a pilot project in Belgian foreign aid based on new guidelines. Bureaucratic incentives to maintain the aid help
to explain why the Minister of Cooperation, Andre Geens, strongly advocated not only renewing but actually increasing aid in late
1991, despite his admission that the government had not undertaken the expected economic and politial reforms.(Willime 1995, pp.
436-439). Another Belgian official who accompanied Geens on his tour of Rwanda in August 1991 noted that he was "very keen on
aid". (Interview, July 1995). The French ambassador in Kigali, George Martre, was known as an "ancien du Rwanda". Matre was not a
diplomat but came from the Ministry of Cooperation. He was described by close observers as a "projects man". Martre was considered
to have wielded considerable if indirect influence on French policy towards Rwanda during his tenure as ambassador from September
1989 until March 1993.
13 The Belgian government lost a debate in the Parliament about keeping the troops in Rwanda. The Christian
Democratic government did not get enough parliamentary support from its coalition partners (who split along
Flemish-French lines) to overcome Socialist opposition to support Habyariamana. A compromise was reached
to send a three-party mission to the region to help set the stage for the peace process.
14 It is worth noting that J.L.Dehaene, the current Defence Minister in Belgium, in his testimony before the
Senate Commission, stated, "If I would have to make the decision to withdraw the Belgian paratroopers
again, I would have made exactly the same decision.“
15 However, as the Senate Report noted, Belgium lacked an information and intelligence gathering
capability.  The government was already prone to act on totally inadequate information sources.
16 French officials word the same thing slightly differently. For example, when French Foreign Minister,
Hubert Vedrine - who was President Mitterand's Chief of Staff during the Rwandan genocide - testified
before the French Parliamentary Enquiry in May of 1998, he stated that French policy, with respect to
Rwanda, had two objectives: helping countries like Rwanda with links to France to ensure security and
protect their borders while continuing economic and political development, and to urge Habyarimana to
share power with the Tutsi and to develop democratic institutions.
17 Contrast this with the claim by Gourevitch (1998) that, "A Military agreement signed in 1975 between
France and Rwanda expressly forbade the involvement of French troops in Rwandan combat, combat
training, or police operations." (p. 89) Though literally true, it is misleading. The French forces were
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dispatched under the existing military assistance agreement between the two states rather than a defence
agreement because a military assistance agreement was the only instrument in place. That agreement did not
make provision for direct involvement of the French military in the conflict. However, it must be recalled that
the French initially conceived of the operation as a modest one in which advisers merely gave advice and did
not actually man the artillery. However, the French military in such situations are given the right of self
defence when attacked, and the French believed that the RPF was a foreign invasion instigated by Museveni
in Uganda.
18 The source of the French Parliamentary Enquiry was a campaign initiated on 3 March 1998 in Paris by
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), along with prominent French academics and NGO's (including Action
Contre La Faim and Ligues des Droits de l'Homme) and human rights activists. The signatories heading the
petition included Henri Leclerc, Ligue des Droits de l'Homme, Marie-Line Ramackers, Agir Ici Relief NGO’s,
Philippe Biberson, President of  Médecins Sans Frontières, Jose Bidegain, Director General of Action Contre la Faim
AICF, as well as the following prominent academics: Jean-François Bayart, Director of Research CNRS, Rony
Brauman, Teacher and former president of Medecins Sans Frontieres, André Guichaoua, Professor at Lille University,
Alfred Grosser, professeur émérite, Alain Joxe, Director of Studies at Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales
(EHESS), Elikia M'Bokolo, Director of Studies at EHESS, Yves Ternon, Doctor Historian, Claudine Vidal, Director of
Research at Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique ( CNRS), Marc Pilon, President of  l'Observatoire Permanent
de la Coopération Française. The campaign presumed mounting evidence of the deep involvement of the
French authorities in the arming and organising of the Rwandan army under President Habyarimana's
government. The publication of the results of the Belgian Senate Enquiry was a catalyst.  But the
petitioners had a number of very specific questions related to French actions on which they wanted
answers. What was France’s role in] the training of the Rwandan “gendarmerie” and the military council,
the provision of uniforms and the delivery of weapons and the direct support for military activity in
Rwanda (in 1990 and 1993)? Why did France support, until the bitter end, a regime which was clearly
committing crimes against its own civilian population? How was the decision taken to evacuate in April
1994 an entire section of the Rwandan political elite involved in the massacres? Beyond the mandate given
to France for the “Operation Turquoise” in June-July 1994 during the last days of the genocide, how was
this intervention really conducted and what were the consequences for Rwanda and the Rwandans? Did
France supply, or organize the transport of, weapons to Kigali after April 6th, 1994?
19 Paul Quiles headed a French parliamentary commission into France's role in Rwanda and the genocide in
the nineties. Its 1200 page report was made public on 15 December 1998. The report rejected all charges
implicating France in the Rwandan genocide. However, the report did point to errors and shortcomings by
French authorities, but Belgium and the US, in particular, as well as the international community in
general, are held to be at fault as well for errors and misjudgements. The US, incidentally did hold Senate
hearings this year but they are not the same as a parliamentary inquiry.
20 Cf. irin@ocha.unon.org Tue Dec 22 06:14:37 1998, Central and Eastern Africa: IRIN Update 571 for 21
December  1998.12.21.
21 It should be noted that Paul Kagame had concluded that not only France, but the whole international
community was engaged in a high-level conspiracy "to protect the killers and, perhaps, to assist them
toward an ultimate victory." (Gourevitch 1998, 338)
22 The two French delegates had been the first to register their criticisms at the presentation. After all the
other delegations commented, it was absolutely clear that the French were alone in their evaluation, and
that all the other concerns expressed, though important in themselves, were not basically critical of the
report. Quite the reverse; the report was generally highly praised. I asked to have lunch with the French
delegates to discuss the issues further. In that lunch, a number of things became clear. First, the delegates,
though they spoke English perfectly well, could not explain their misinterpretations of the English text
version. Second, the delegates themselves were not well enough versed in the issues to stand behind and
substantiate their criticisms; they could only echo the party line. Third, I asked why they were upset given
that, in my reading of our report compared to the numerous books and articles that I had read on the French
role that had been published in France, our report was far less vitriolic. It had tried to provide an in-depth
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account and explanation of the government's actions. As they explained the French reaction, the French
officials loved their intellectuals but paid no attention to what they said. But they could not ignore the barbs
directed their way from foreigners. Those criticisms hurt French honour. As we left the lunch I remarked
openly that France seemed to have learned nothing since the Franco-Prussian war, for, according to
Trevelyan, the historian, the French government had mobilized to defend French honour insulted by
Bismark's editing of the famous Ems telegram. Further, the discussion seemed to add confirmation to
Prunier's (1995) interpretation of Opération Turquoise, namely, that it had been launched to protect French
honour.
23 I would have liked to have read the Parliamentary Commission Report before submitting this report, but I
have had not received the copy yet that I requested be sent from France, and the deadline was already two
days past because I had spent so much time searching the internet hoping that someone would have posted
the report. If it was there, I did not find it (and that would not be the first time). So this paper is not based
on a direct reading of the documents, analysis and conclusions of that report.
24. Though the ostensible rationale for the French intervention was the same as the Belgian one - the protection of nationals -
during the first phase of the war, the French performed rear-guard duty for the Rwandan army by securing the airport, manning
road blocks in the Kigali area, and providing logistics.
25 On 12 December 1992, the New York Times Magazine carried a lengthy report on French arms sales to
Rwanda and French fighting on behalf of the Rwandan army.
26 Gourevitch, for example, states, "In the nights of June 16 and 18, arms shipments for the Hutu Power
regime were landed, with French connivance, in the eastern Zairean city of Goma [the headquarters for
Opération Turquoise] and shuttled over the border to Rwanda." (1998, p. 155) This was, of course, the
same day that the UN Security Council endorsed Opération Turquoise. Since Gourevitch provides no
sources for his charges, it is virtually impossible to check them. I can say that from all the bills of lading
that I examined for arms shipments to the Hutu extremists in Zaire found after the camps were evacuated,
enough arms to equip a 30,000 person army, there is no hint of French connivance. Given the demands for
prepayment and collection, there is evidence that payment for the arms was no longer guaranteed by
France. Further, there is a logical explanation for the transport of arms across the border on June 22. It is
clear that the French anticipated Security Council approval and began preparations five days earlier. "The
order to the French forces to prepare to move was given on 17 June, five days before authorised by the UN
and nine days before the Rwanda/Zaire border was crossed ." M. Connaghton, "Military Support and
Protection for Humanitarian Assistance - Rwanda: April-December 1994," report prepared for ODI. Cf.
http://www.ha.sps.cam.ac.uk/freps/FR001A.Htm.
27 Our error on this one point explains the vehemence with which the French attacked us on this issue. As
with many others, based on the evidence we accumulated and cited, we had stated that the French
continued to ship arms to Kigali even after the genocide had started. This interpretation was reinforced
when we presented our draft report. One ambassador came up to me and told me not to be intimidated by
the French. He had been on the tarmac of Kigali airport being evacuated five days after the coup and the
genocide had started and observed cases being unloaded with French arms. I did not have my wits about me
at the time to clarify how precisely he determined that they were French arms, but presumably it was a
deduction based on the French labeling on the packing cases. In fact, as I shall show, this same evidence
understandably seemed to have misled most people. The immediate past practices of the French and their
unwillingness to be forthcoming did not get out the exact truth on this one point. The French unwillingness
to be forthcoming about this matter in the way of evidence may be explained by three reasons. First, once it
came out that we were in error on this point, the credibility of our claims on other issues would be more in
question. Second, revealing out error on this issue would have meant revealing the truth about the other
charges concerning arms shipments. Third,  it is difficult but, contrary to what many believe, far from
impossible to 'prove' a counterfactual.
28 The evidence is based on a series of bills of lading for military supplies from MHL-Tec Corporation
Limited, Ragnal House, Peel Road, Isle-of-Man as well as the dunning financial collection letters they had
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sent concerning the shipment that arrived in the week after the genocide started. Evidently, any payment
guarantees had been cancelled by that point. Further, although the arms had come from Eastern Europe and
had been shipped via Russian Israeli intermediaries, they seemed to have carried French labels. Possibly
this was done to mislead any observer who might be enforcing the arms embargo in order to make it appear
that these arms were part of an outstanding shipment before the embargo was introduced.
29 Cf. Endnote 1.
30 In Findlay's view, a key lesson was that the lack of an organised formal Core Group of interested
countries prepared to “nurture, shepherd, assist, cajole, bribe and if necessary coerce the parties towards
fulfilling their obligations” (165) threatened the process from the start. Findlay points out that the reason
for this was the lack of a major power interested enough to take the lead as a patron state to pressure
international organisations and other governments on behalf of the peace process. He also cast light on the
discussions leading to the creation of the new UN peacekeeping mission to replace NMOG and UNOMUR.
Because the OAU had readily acknowledged its inability to field an entire peacekeeping operation, the
claim made by Study 2 of the JEEAR report that the decision was motivated by France and the Rwandan
government who had suspected the regional organisation’s partisanship with the RPF. On the controversy
over the OAU or the UN providing the force, Findlay made the following observation on the report I co-
authored with Astri Suhrke (1998). “The Joint Evaluation takes a conspiratorial view of the decision [for a
UN-led operation], attributing it in part to French machinations designed to keep control of the force out of
the hands of what it perceived to be a pro-RPF OAU.” (Findlay for UNITAR, 167) What I believe we did
say was that the Rwandese were suspicious of the UN because of the French role in the Security Council
and preferred the OAU. There was a complementary fear that the OAU would be biased towards the RPF,
but this suggestion hardly amounts to a conspiratorial view. Further, when the OAU admitted its
limitations, the RPF accepted the UN playing that role.
31 Keller holds such a view. “Apart from the failure of adversaries to make credible commitments in the
course of third-party negotiations, much of the blame for the failures in such efforts must be laid at the feet
of the international community, which has always been reluctant to intervene either coercively or non-
coercively in conflicts where they do not perceive their vital national interests to be at stake.” (In Lake and
Rothchild, Chapter 12: 289)
32 As Connaughton wrote, "this (OT) could also be regarded  - given the very close relations between the
Habyarimana and Mitterand regimes, and visceral French hostility to the RPF - as a device for defending an
area of Rwandan territory against the RPF, and protecting French clients in the old regime, killers included,
who were flooding into the region before the RPF advance." (cf. Prunier 1995, ch. 8; Verschave and Vital
1994, ch3:7; Reed 1998)
33 Connaughton (1995) argued that the FAR withdrew over the Zaire border in hopes that the French would
clash with the RPF., but the French persuaded Kagame of the humanitarian intentions of the intervention..
(Section 2, 10) I think Connaughton over-estimated the French powers of persuasion as well as Kagame's
susceptibilities.
34 Rudy Brueggemann's French Connection web page provided a narrower range for the number of lives
saved. "According to Rwanda watchers, Opération Turquoise did save 12,000 to 15,000 Tutsi lives, though
some Tutsi were killed once they came out of hiding after seeing French flags flown on roadsides to greet
the arriving French troops. TV images made during the time embarrassingly show Hutu genocidaires
holding pictures of Mitterand." Http://www.oz.net/-rudybrue/frenchconnection.htm.
35 Vaccaro's analysis does suggest that the mission at least partially favored the RGA over the RPF.  The
RPF/Hutu were withdrawing westwards and the French imposed ‘Humanitarian Protected Zone’ seemed
well-positioned to protect them. RPF officials were warned not to penetrate this zone, and FAR troops were
able to seek sanctuary in this area. His final conclusion was that OT "must be considered a success. If it had
not occurred the remaining Tutsi in the southwest would likely have been killed.” (398)
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36 MSF declared that, although the mission was successful in that it saved lives and controlled the flow of
refugees, it was politically slanted in favour of the Hutus. “The venture was much criticised. And for good
reason. It allowed numerous criminals to find a previously unimagined form of exile in the French-
established security zone. Yet it did save lives within the safety zone. It diminished the flow of refugees to
Zaire, it protected some of those Tutsis who remained alive and some Hutus against revenge killings.” (6-7)
However, MSF expressed concern that Turquoise sets a dangerous practice of UN subcontracting. “While
the French government announced Operation Turquoise in Rwanda, the venture was greeted with
widespread hostility. The French was basically subcontracting a UN responsibility […] the UN may be
turned into a flag of convenience.” (11) Finally, the overall motive for the operation is suspect:  “French
troops were sent in to protect the civilians and discourage any exodus towards Zaire.  But the intent was
less to provide sustained protection than mount a dramatic, headline-catching intervention on behalf of
France’s clients – the Rwandan Hutu – who were now losing the war.”  (82) Predergast's analysis was
similar. “Turquoise was designed to facilitate humanitarian aid in the southwest corner of Rwanda,
performed well on technical grounds but created major political problems in two areas.  First, it provided a
safe haven for retreating government officials, military officers, and militia members, allowing and even
aiding their orderly exodus into Zaire. Second., it undermined the UN’s efforts to get troop commitments
for UNAMIR and weakened multilateral intervention objectives.” (65-66)
37 This former UNAMIR Deputy Force Commander was nevertheless skeptical of the France/RGF
conspiracy judging from the manner in which the French had conducted the Nationals Evacuation
Operation on 9-11 April. “Those of us who were in Kigali before 6 April and saw the way the French came
in and evacuated their nationals believed that France meant well. If France wanted a fight with the RPF or
wanted to help the RGF why did the commando battalion withdraw after rescuing the nationals? Another
demonstration of the genuineness of the French intention was when UNAMIR decided to introduce its
troops into the HPZ; they gladly welcomed the idea. Their mandate was for two months (22 June to 22
August), and GHANBLATT, being the only formed troops on the ground, was rushed into that zone on 31
July to work alongside the French for an eventual take-over…The warm manner in which I was received,
briefed and conducted around [by General Lafourcade, head of OT] reassured me of the genuineness of
French intentions in Rwanda.” (1997, 103)
38 Ambassador Albright in her testimony to the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the House Appropriations
Committee, 5/5/94.
39 If interest was the singular justification for involvement, all other explanations for US inaction in
Rwanda are irrelevant, for à priori there would be little US involvement in Rwanda. As Herman Cohen, ,
the Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, stated it in his testimony before the Belgian Commisiion of
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